Voting Security Rights
Confidential Ballot Security:
Balancing Voter Privacy With Secure Election Remediation and Public Trust
Voting security requires a careful balance between protecting voter privacy and preserving the ability to detect, remediate, and correct election fraud.
We cannot maintain free, fair, transparent, and secure elections without enforcing both strict confidentiality protections for individual voters and equally strict protections for the chain of custody of ballots.
Leaning too heavily toward secrecy risks enabling undetected fraud; leaning too heavily toward disclosure risks voter intimidation.
Both must be balanced wisely to protect the true, uncorrupted will of the people.
I. Protecting Vulnerable Voter Populations
Certain individuals face real threats to their safety if their personal information becomes publicly accessible. To protect these citizens while preserving election integrity:
- State, County, and Local law must provide privacy protections for individuals placed at risk by exposure of their location.
- Most U.S. states provide an Address Confidentiality Program (ACP) that classifies the name and addresses for protected classes, including:
1. Domestic violence victims
2. Violent crime victims
3. Sexual assault victims
4. Stalking victims
5. Human trafficking victims
6. Witness Protection Program participants
7. Law enforcement officers
8. Judges, prosecutors, and court personnel
9. Other individuals meeting legislatively defined proof of pending harm
Public Records Protection for ACP Participants
Voter Registration Lists (VRL):
➔ Must preserve the integrity of the ACP protections provided to these classes of people. Reference to the master AG list that coorilates these individuals to the justification providing protected class status.
Precinct-Level Voter Participation Lists:
➔ ACP participants' names and addresses are not shared at the district or precinct level.
➔ The number of ACP voters participating in each district and precinct is disclosed without exposing protected identifyable information about the individuals.
II. Oversight and Management of Address Confidentiality Programs
Management of the ACP must be vested in the State Attorney General's Office.
To prevent single-party control, Balanced Election Management Offices must have oversight powers over ACP program operations.
Individuals managing or auditing ACP data must possess the appropriate classified information clearance.
Any audit requiring access to accurate names and addresses must:
- Be limited to classified-clearance individuals.
- Follow strict procedures defined by Federal, State, County, and Local law.
III. Balancing Voter Confidentiality and Election Remediation
Voting security also demands the ability to detect and remediate election fraud without exposing individual voters' ballot choices.
Requirements for Voter Confidentiality and Chain of Custody:
All voters must receive equal confidentiality protections after their ballot is cast.
Ballot-to-voter correlations (Voter ID to UBID records) must be:
- Classified information requiring security clearance for access.
- Separated so that no single record connects a ballot directly to a voter without authorized procedures.
Chain of Custody Records:
- The Ballot Custody Chain must track the legal transfer of a ballot from issuance to casting.
- The chain must show when the ballot was in voter possession without revealing the voter's ballot choices.
This structure preserves the ability to investigate and remediate election fraud without breaching voter confidentiality.
IV. Procedures for Handling Voter-to-Ballot Correlation Data
Assignment of UBID at Check-In:
- When a legal ballot is issued to a voter, its Unique Ballot ID (UBID) is recorded in the Voter Participation Check-In Record.
- UBIDs are recorded in a manner allowing easy redaction for public records and eventual destruction on a legislatively determined schedule.
Separation of Records:
- The UBID-to-Voter-ID Correlation Record is maintained separately from the ballots themselves.
- This ensures:
- Ballots cannot reveal a voter's identity.
- Voter lists cannot reveal ballot choices.
Security of Voter-to-UBID Correlation Records:
- Strict classified access standards govern these records.
- Public records releases must have all UBID information redacted unless accessed under appropriate legal clearance.
Retention and Deletion Policies:
- Voter Ballot Custody Records must be securely deleted no later than three months after election certification, unless legislative processes require further retention for legal proceedings.
Closing
Voting confidentiality and election security must coexist without compromise.
By enforcing rigorous classified protections for voter privacy while maintaining complete chain of custody and secure audit capabilities, we ensure that elections are free from intimidation, fraud, and corruption — and that every lawful citizen can cast their vote with confidence.